When the Soviet Union broke up, many countries received theirfreedom from the ways of a communist past. With these freedoms, countries likeUzbekistan had to come about with their own political landscape and decide onhow they would continue to organize and enact on governmental duties. (Hesli,2007, 385).
While there was certainly a framework set in place by communist partychief Islam Karimov when he accepted the presidency in 1991, there was still anopportunity for the Uzbeks to implement a more fair and just democratic processinto the government. (Photius, 2017). We will look at the political landscapeof the former Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, and pay attention to the threebranches of the government, which include the judicial, legislative, executivebranches and how they function, including a look at the presidential rule andhow it interacts with them to see if this landscape is a viable one for futurestability. While Uzbekistan as a former Soviet republic has the ability to makechanges, we will see if this is actually happening or is it simply a façade,like we have seen before in Russian politics. Uzbekistan operates under apresidential constitutional system, whereas the president is the head of thegovernment and the head of the state. (Mongabay, 2017). In order to understandthis system a little more we will first look at the constitution of Uzbekistan.The constitution backs the executive government, with power to name governmentand break up assembly.
By and by, a dictator state with all power in officialand concealment of contradiction. From the earliest starting point of hisadministration, Karimov stayed submitted in words to establishing democraticchanges. (Hays, 2017). Formally the constitution made a partition of forcesamong a solid administration, the governing body, and a legal. Practicallyspeaking, be that as it may, these progressions have been to a great extentcorrective. Uzbekistan stays among the most tyrant states in Central Asia.
Despite the fact that the dialect of the constitution incorporates numerous democratichighlights, it can be superseded by official declarations and enactment, andfrequently protected law just is disregarded. (Mongabay, 2017). The presidentis the head of state and is conceded preeminent official power by theconstitution.
He has the ability to choose not only the prime minister but alsothe full cabinet, also the judges whom represent the three national courts, subjectto the endorsement of the assembly, and to choose all individuals to members ofthe lower courts. (Hesli, 2007, 385). The president likewise has the ability tobreak up the parliament, basically refuting the Oly Majlis’ ability to vetocontrol over presidential selections in a energy battle circumstance. (Hays,2017).
Delegates of legislature are chosen to five-year terms. The body mightbe expelled by the president with the alignment of the Constitutional Court;since that court is liable to presidential arrangement, the expulsion conditionweights the power vigorously toward the executive branch. The Oly Majlis orderslegislation, inside of the parliament, by the high courts, by the procuratorgeneral (most noteworthy law requirement official in the nation), or by theadministration of the Province of Karakalpakstan. (Hays, 2017).
The national legislationincludes the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the High EconomicCourt. Lower court frameworks exist at the local, area, and town levels. (Hays,2017). Judges at all levels are selected by the president and affirmed by theOly Majlis. (Hays, 2017).
Free from alternate branches of government, thecourts stay under total control of the official branch. First, we will look at the overallstructure of the executive branch and its conquest to take out any and allopposition. Karimov has gathered forces that guarantee full strength of the governmentprocedure for whatever length of time that he is president. He selects the PrimeMinister, all individuals from the cabinet, all individuals from the judiciary,16 individuals from the recently shaped Senate, and every provincial official. (Hesli,2007, 388). He likewise has developed or debilitated the tribes that frame theconventional political texture of Uzbekistan, including the effective clan fromSamarkand that place him in control. (Mongabay, 2017).
Karimov has utilized hisimmediate control of the National Security Service as far as possible limitingopposition. The cabinet is an elastic stamp collection of six prime minister deputies,14 ministers, and the heads of five offices and state committees. The presidentwas initially expected to be chosen to five-year terms, serving a most extremeof two terms. In March 1995, Karimov secured a 99 percent share in a riggedvote to expand his term as president from the endorsed next race in. (Hays, 2017).In 2002 choice expanded the president’s term from five years to eight years.
TheCabinet of Ministers is formally headed by the Prime Minister; it isresponsible to the President and the Parliament. (Hays, 2017). This setup wecan see why the executive branch holds all of the power within the governmentof Uzbekistan. With the judiciary lacking any independence to make changes and withthe legislature, whom hardly are ever available to meets, the executive branch overseenby the president, continues to make the decisions around the laws and any majortouchpoints that concern or are in interest of the country. The following branch of government isthe authoritative framework, which is spoken to by the Oliy Majilis orparliament.
Uzbekistan has a bicameral Parliament which is picked and assignedfor a five-year term. It includes, an Upper House or Senate with 100 people, 84of whom are picked by viloyat managing social events and 16 of whom areassigned by the President; and a Lower House or Legislative Chamber with 150people, who are picked by understood vote. (Mongabay, 2017).
In 2002 anaccommodation supplanted the one-chamber Parliament with a bicameral gatheringunder the president’s control. The representing body has little power. Peopleare picked in a methodology that shields the protection from sharing. Karimov’svitality in the parliament has been clear in that body’s increase of thepresidential term of office from five to seven years in 2002 and by itsclarification that Karimov’s first term connected until 2000, engaging him tocontinue running for a “moment” time.
(Hays, 2017). Following thetwo-round parliamentary races, the Oly Majlis included people from fivepolitical gatherings, which were all for the administration. The third branch that we will take agander at is the Judicial, which is involved the Supreme Court, which has 34judges sorted out into various segments. At that point the protected court,which is made of 7 judges and a higher financial court which contains 19judges.
Judge decision and term of office: judges of the 3 most hoisted courtschose by the president and insisted by the Oliy Majlis; judges designated for5-year terms subject to reappointment. (Photius, 2017). Uzbekistan apparentlyhas a self-ruling legal branch. In any case, essentially decisions of thelegitimate all around take after those of the Office of the Procuracy, thestate prosecutorial association, and the president can appoint and clearjudges. The national legal fuses the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court,and the High Economic Court.
Lower court structures exist at the commonplace,district, and town levels. Judges at all levels are named by the president andattested by the Oly Majlis. Apparently free of exchange branches of government,the courts remain under aggregate control of the official branch. (Photius,2017).
As in the plan of the Soviet time, the procurator general and hisneighborhood and adjacent reciprocals are both the state’s head chargingspecialists and the primary operators of criminal cases, an outline that limitsthe privileges of the indicted. (Hays, 2017). In this presidential regime we cansee how the different branches of government relate to each other. The overarching theme is that the president controls not only the executive branch butalso the judicial and legislative branches as well. (Hays, 2017). The beliefthat the country is looking for democratic reform is different than the actionsthat it is taking. The president has all of the power, which is extremelysimilar to Russia and in some cases even more openly authoritarian. Even incases where there are opportunities to bring about change through laws and politicalparties, the president has a back-door scenario in almost every case to eitheropenly deny the act or rely on his appointed members of the various branches todeny the act.
(Hays, 2017). There are still massive amounts of corruption anddeceit in the political landscape and the traits of a strong communist partybeliefs are still present and flourishing. Even with the inclusion of multipleparties the government continues to actively suppress their movements andopenly bans public meetings and demonstrations that are not sanctioned by thegovernment. This oppression also flows over into various communication channelssuch as newspapers, radio and television, which limits the amount of informationthat is shared with the population. (Hesli, 2007, 413).The development towardmonetary change in Uzbekistan has not been aligned with the development towardpolitical change.
The legislature of Uzbekistan has rather fixed its graspsince freedom in September 1991, breaking down progressively on resistancegatherings. In spite of the fact that the names have changed, theestablishments of government stay like those that existed before the separationof the Soviet Union. (Mongabay, 2017).
The legislature has advocated itsrestriction of open get together, resistance parties, and the media bystressing the requirement for security and a continuous way to deal with changeamid the transitional period, referring to the contention and tumult in theother previous. This approach has discovered belief among a large part ofUzbekistan’s population, albeit such a position may not be reasonable over thelong haul. Looking atthe stability of the Uzbekistan government comes in two-fold. The first thingthat must be looked at is the current standing of the government. In spite ofthe trappings of institutional change, the main years of autonomy saw moreprotection than acknowledgment of the institutional changes required for a democraticlaw based change to grab hold. Whatever underlying development toward democracyrules system existed in Uzbekistan in the beginning of freedom appears to havebeen overwhelmed by the dormancy of the staying Soviet-style solid broughttogether authority.
This soviet style presence is still very strong and in thatessence the current government standing is stable. The authoritarian party willcontinue to take the lead and make changes as they see fit and the presidentsgrasp will not be able to be challenged, which seems to be aligned with whatthe majority wants. (Hesli, 2007, 413). In looking at the future of thegovernment and its desire to want to become more democratic will be necessaryfor any sort of long term solution in the current global political landscape.Even in looking at comparison on how the neighboring country of Kyrgyzstan hasbecome more democratic and instilled the beliefs into the government, therelationship between the two countries is constantly under turmoil. Due to thisUzbekistan is not overly concerned with what they are doing or seeing how itcould be a potentially positive thing to bring about the change. (Hesli, 2007, 391).
Overall, I do see the current political regime as stable but the long termimplications of this soviet styled regime will not be stable and needs tochange from the current corrupt system to a more democratic process. Thiscontinues to be the same behavior that we see in Russia, where there arepromises of democratic reform and it appears that it is happening, but in theback end there is little progress being made. The presidential system in Russiais slightly different on the surface but once you look deeper into the innerworkings and how each of the branches is limited in their power, we can see thesame similarities with Uzbekistan.